The following is part of an occasional series on specific rules and regulations governing financial professions. This article will analyze FINRA Rule 2111, which establishes an advisor’s duty to recommend investments that are suitable for his or her customers.
Rule 2111 – Suitability
(a) A member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to ascertain the customer’s investment profile. A customer’s investment profile includes, but is not limited to, the customer’s age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the customer may disclose to the member or associated person in connection with such recommendation.
(b) A member or associated person fulfills the customer-specific suitability obligation for an institutional account, as defined in Rule 4512(c), if (1) the member or associated person has a reasonable basis to believe that the institutional customer is capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in general and with regard to particular transactions and investment strategies involving a security or securities and (2) the institutional customer affirmatively indicates that it is exercising independent judgment in evaluating the member’s or associated person’s recommendations. Where an institutional customer has delegated decision-making authority to an agent, such as an investment adviser or a bank trust department, these factors shall be applied to the agent.
- INTRODUCTION
Consider a hypothetical investor who is retired and wants his portfolio to generate a reliable monthly income. Now, suppose his advisor[1] devotes most of his liquid assets to an investment that, at best, could deliver a big one-time payment several years down the road. The investment’s problems are obvious. It contradicts the investor’s financial goals and, worse, exposes him to the risk of losing most of his money. Or put another way, the investment is not suitable for him.
To guard against these scenarios, FINRA Rule 2111 prohibits advisors from recommending a security unless they have confirmed it is suitable for the customer. The rule’s core mission is to protect customers from investments that work against their financial interests.
Suitability depends on whether the recommendation fits the customer’s investment profile – essentially, an account of his or her financial objectives and risk tolerance. If the investment fits the profile, it is suitable. If not, it is unsuitable.
To make this call, advisors must conduct a thorough analysis of the security before recommending it. The investment is not suitable unless it meets three conditions:
- Reasonable-basis suitability – The investment is suitable for at least some investors.
- Customer-specific suitability – The investment is suitable for the customer in question.
- Quantitative suitability – The number of transactions is not excessive.
A diligent evaluation from all three of these angles will protect most advisors from a 2111 violation. And even when it does not, the advisor’s diligence will help prevent serious sanctions – which for this rule, can include a permanent bar from the securities industry.
II. DETERMINING SUITABILITY
The suitability analysis begins with Rule 2111’s Supplementary Material .05. This establishes three categories of suitability: (1) reasonable-basis suitability; (2) customer-specific suitability; and (3) quantitative suitability.[2] An advisor cannot recommend an investment unless it fits all three categories.
Thematically, some panels will link the first two categories, labeling each a component of “qualitative suitability.”[3] In effect, this divides suitability into two – rather than three – distinct forms. First, in and of itself, every investment the advisor recommends must be suitable (“qualitative suitability”). Second, even if the investment is suitable by itself, an advisor cannot recommend such a high volume that it becomes inconsistent with the customer’s financial position (“quantitative suitability”).
A. Qualitative suitability
Continuing with this structure, generally, panels analyze the two parts of qualitative suitability together. This happens through a staged inquiry.[4] First, they ask whether the recommendation demonstrates “reasonable-basis suitability.” This means the investment is suitable for at least some investors.[5] If it clears this hurdle, the inquiry turns to “customer-specific suitability” or whether the investment is suitable for the customer in question.[6]
- Reasonable-basis suitability
Reasonable-basis suitability depends on whether the advisor knows the recommended security well enough to conclude it is suitable for at least some investors.[7] Thus, if the advisor is not already familiar with the security, he or she must make a reasonably diligent effort to learn about it. Conversely, without gaining this knowledge, the advisor has no reasonable basis for claiming the security is suitable for anyone.[8]
In short, reasonable-basis suitability focuses on the advisor’s understanding of the security rather than the security itself. Indeed, a security may be suitable for some investors. But if the advisor recommends it without understanding why, he or she has not established reasonable-basis suitability.
While reasonable-basis suitability is a less common tripwire than the other categories, panels do find advisors liable when they make no more than a cursory attempt to understand a security.[9] For example, in Siegel, the advisor recommended that four customers invest in debentures issued by a start-up called World ET. But his only investigation was reading the offering materials. And here, these happened to be “one of the worst sets of offering materials [the advisor had] ever seen.” As such, no one could tell “what [the customers] were investing in.”[10] So the advisor could not have obtained sufficient knowledge from the offering materials alone and, thus, could not have known whether the debentures were suitable for any investors.
In Palatian, the advisor (Palatian) made more recommendations despite even less effort. Specifically, he recommended non-traded real estate investment trusts (“REIT’s”) to at least 54 of his customers. When he began doing this, Palatian had no familiarity with REIT’s. And despite continuing to recommend these investments for four years, he did almost nothing to educate himself about them.[11] Not surprisingly, Palatin admitted he understood little about non-traded REIT’s during the period he recommended them.[12] Therefore, he did not perform adequate due diligence or establish reasonable-basis suitability.
Both these cases are obvious and, thus, do not establish how thorough an investigation must be to support reasonable-basis suitability. That said, they do show that advisors who recommend securities before knowing how they operate risk angering Rule 2111.
2. Customer-specific suitability
To achieve customer-specific suitability, a recommendation must be suitable for the customer in question. Essentially, this means the security needs to match the customer’s investment profile. So whereas reasonable-basis suitability requires the advisor to understand the security, customer-specific suitability adds that he or she must understand the customer’s financial situation.[13]
Customer-specific suitability also requires disclosure. That is, the advisor must disclose the investment’s risks to the customer and get his or her agreement to move forward.[14] Still, by themselves, disclosure and the customer’s agreement are not enough to satisfy customer-specific suitability. Even in these situations, the advisor must make an independent determination that the investment is in the customer’s best interests.[15]
- Common fact pattern
When advisors’ recommendations are deemed unsuitable for their customers, the cases tend to follow a similar script. First, the customers’ investment profiles are similar. Often, these customers are unsophisticated.[16] They are retired or nearing retirement.[17] Though not always “seniors,” few are younger than 50. As such, they favor investments that generate stable and consistent income.[18] In many cases, their original portfolios contained multiple securities that were achieving this goal.[19]
Nonetheless, the advisor recommends an investment that clashes with many aspects of the customer’s profile.[20] The investment may offer a big payout, but also a high risk. Or the products are complicated and, thus, only appropriate for sophisticated investors.[21] By contrast, the advisor began recommending the product despite having little experience with it.[22] And he or she continues to sell the product without taking meaningful steps to learn more about it.[23]
Then, with a push from the advisor, the customer agrees to the investment and devotes significant assets to it. In some instances, this can mean selling or surrendering the investments that were generating the consistent income he or she needs.[24]
The result is predictable. The investment fails, and the customer loses significant money.[25]
- Examples of liability
The following examples highlight how fact patterns like the one above result in Rule 2111 violations.
Noard
In Noard, the customer, JD, was an 84-year-old widow with limited income or investment experience.[26] She was most interested in reliable income for her retirement – a wish she communicated to her advisor, Noard.[27]
Noard recommended that JD invest in debentures issued by a life insurance settlement company known as GWG.[28] The life settlement industry was a speculative one. Moreover, GWG was a relatively new entrant. Since its inception, the company had operated at a loss, and a large portion of its financing came through debt.[29]
The debentures themselves were a long-term investment. That is, except in rare cases, investors could not redeem them prior to maturity. So they only made sense for those with substantial liquidity, as these people could hold the debentures for long stretches, waiting for a big return at maturity. Because this return was not guaranteed, the investment carried significant risk.[30]
In fact, even GWG warned of the downside. The company issued its own “Suitability Standards,” which emphasized how each purchaser of a debenture could lose his or her entire investment.[31]
Still, Noard recommended JD devote half her liquid assets to purchasing the debentures.[32] The panel found this unsuitable for multiple reasons. Most notably, the debentures were the opposite of her investment goals. As a retired senior, JD lacked significant cash flow. So she wanted her investments to generate regular income. Conversely, the debentures fit investors with the cash flow to wait until they mature. In other words, these were people who could do without a regular income while they pursued a big long-term payout.[33] Moreover, JD’s total assets were low. So unlike the ideal purchaser, she could not pump money into GWG’s debentures and endure the risk of losing it all. In short, the debentures were wrong for the customer and, thus, unsuitable.[34]
Faber
In Faber, the conduct was more extreme. The advisor, Faber, recommended his customers use substantial portions of their assets to purchase stock in Interbet – an online gambling company that was barely a year old.[35] At the time Faber began mentioning Interbet to his customers, it generated no revenue and had taken almost $200,000 in net losses.[36]
But pursuant to a reverse merger, Interbet began selling shares.[37] Without disclosing the many drawbacks of relying on Interbet, Faber encouraged his customers to buy the company’s shares.[38]
Donna McKinzie, an office manager in her 50’s, was one of these customers. As an investor, her main objective was bolstering her retirement savings – mostly by purchasing bonds. Initially, Faber followed these instructions and bought corporate bonds.[39]
But when Interbet came along, he changed course. Faber began pitching shares from the reverse merger to McKinzie, promising they could triple her money. He did not disclose the investment’s speculative nature – in particular, Interbet’s lack of revenue and consistent losses.[40] Based on Faber’s recommendation, McKinzie agreed to purchase Interbet stock.[41] Faber then sold all McKinzie’s bonds and devoted the proceeds to buying Interbet shares.[42] Within two months, McKinzie had lost her entire investment.[43]
The panel concluded Faber’s recommendation to invest heavily in Interbet clashed with McKinzie’s investment goals and income.[44] McKinzie wanted to purchase bonds to increase her retirement savings. Faber, however, sent her in the opposite direction by moving most of her assets into the high-risk Interbet. McKinzie’s modest income also meant she could not bear the risk – ultimately, realized – of Interbet failing.[45] Thus, Faber violated the suitability rule.[46]
- Example of non-liability
Watkins deviated from the above fact pattern – and yielded the opposite result. There, Watkins was the advisor, and VG was his customer. While the decision does not provide VG’s age, she was collecting social security at the time.[47] Her investment profile favored “moderate risk” and “current income.”[48] She lived off her social security payments and returns from her portfolio, which consisted mainly of stocks and mutual funds, with a small number of bonds.[49]
VG needed her portfolio to generate $3000 per month in income and hired Watkins to help. Watkins responded by researching several options. These included collateralized mortgage options (“CMO’s”), corporate bonds, treasury bonds, and certificates of deposit.[50] Eventually, he chose CMO’s because he believed they were the only option that could achieve the $3000 per month return VG required.[51]
After consulting professionals who worked with CMO’s, Watkins determined a Countrywide CMO worked best for VG.[52] Relatively speaking, this product was safe. It sported a AAA rating, did not rely on sub-prime loans, and included tranches that guaranteed reliable monthly payments.[53]
Still, before purchasing the CMO’s, Watkins met with VG for over an hour. During the meeting he explained the CMO’s to her – how they operated, and how they fit her financial objectives. He then left her with additional written information.[54]
After reviewing the materials, VG decided to purchase $400,000 of the CMO’s that Watkins recommended. For this transaction, Watkins received a one-time $800 commission.[55]
Then came the 2008 financial crisis. As mortgage-backed securities were the main cause, the value of VG’s CMO’s dropped. This forced Watkins to sell them for $.79 on the dollar, leaving VG with a total loss of approximately $86,000.[56]
Believing Watkins recommended VG purchase CMO’s from an “interest only” tranche, the FINRA hearing panel found Watkins violated the suitability rule. The panel concluded an interest only tranche only fit sophisticated investors – a group that did not include VG. Nonetheless, it did not find his actions egregious, as it only issued him a censure and a $5000 fine.[57]
But even this mild penalty did not survive appeal. FINRA’s National Adjudicatory Counsel noticed that the CMO tranche Watkins recommended was not, in fact, “interest only.” So the recommendation met the suitability standard, and Watkins did not violate the rule.[58]
b. Overconcentration
Investments can also be qualitatively unsuitable when they lead to an overconcentration of the customer’s assets. The SEC has found, “repeatedly,” that “high concentration in one or a limited number of speculative securities is not suitable for investors seeking limited risk.”[59] Neither FINRA nor the SEC has established a specific threshold for overconcentration. So like other forms of unsuitability, it is determined case-by-case.
Notably, where other forms of suitability are lacking, overconcentration often follows. For example, in Noard, the advisor’s recommendation meant that 50% of the customer’s assets was devoted to the GWG debentures.[60] In Faber, the representative committed all $52,000 worth of the customer’s assets with the firm and two-thirds of her total liquid assets to an investment in the highly questionable Interbet.[61] So these advisors not only recommended unsuitable investments, but also increased the risk by dumping a large portion of the customers’ portfolios into them.
Though not mentioned in the decisions, overconcentration may accompany suitability cases because it draws attention to the unsuitable recommendations. No matter how suitable, a relatively small investment could fail without inflicting much damage on the customer’s finances. Thus, FINRA would be less likely to notice, and the customer would be less likely to register a complaint.
B. Quantitative Suitability
Quantitative suitability tests whether a series of recommended transactions, taken together, are suitable for the customer. A series can be quantitatively unsuitable even if each transaction is, on its own, suitable.[62] Or put another way, an excessive number of suitable transactions can equal a violation of Rule 2111.
As explained in the commentary on 2111, there is no “decisive test” for quantitative unsuitability.[63] Instead, the commentary identifies three factors that help detect excessive trading, which indicates quantitative unsuitability: (1) turnover rate; (2) cost-to-equity ratio; and (3) “in-and-out trading.”[64]
- Turnover rate
The turnover rate equals the number of times in a year that a portfolio of securities is traded for another portfolio.[65] It is calculated by dividing the aggregate amount of the purchases in an account by the average monthly investment.[66] Generally, a rate of 6 indicates excessive trading – though excessive trading has been found where the rate was below 4. [67]
To understand turnover rate, it may help to consider a hypothetical customer and advisor. Imagine the customer has an account holding $100,000 in securities. Over the next 12 months, the advisor purchases and sells dozens of new securities for him. Combined, the purchases total $1 million, for which the advisor receives significant commissions. Still, despite purchasing $1 million, the value in the customer’s account remains around $100,000 for the entire year. The turnover rate would equal the $1M in aggregate purchases, multiplied by $100,000, the average monthly account value. So the turnover rate is 10. And because a turnover rate of 6 indicates excessive trading, the advisor’s recommendations would be quantitatively unsuitable.
2. Cost-to-equity ratio
An account’s cost-to-equity ratio is the amount it must appreciate to cover commission and expenses.[68] Put another way, it is the “break-even point when a customer might expect to start seeing a return.”[69] This number is calculated by dividing total expenses by average monthly equity. Generally, a ratio of 20% indicates excessive trading.[70]
Again, consider a hypothetical customer and advisor. The advisor recommends and purchases a $100 security for the customer. The advisor gets a $5 commission. The purchase also requires another $25 in transaction costs. So the total cost of the purchase is $30. As such, the security would have to appreciate more than 30% of its purchase price, or $30, for the customer to profit from it. This 30% cost-to-equity ratio exceeds the 20% threshold for quantitively unsuitable trading. So here, the advisor has violated the suitability rule.
3. “In-and-out trading”
“In-and-out trading” occurs when, over a short period of time, an advisor buys and sells securities in the following pattern: buys a security, sells the security, uses the proceeds to buy a new security, sells the new security, uses the proceeds to buy another new security, etc.[71] This has been termed a “hallmark of excessive trading.”[72]
III. Penalties
The FINRA Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) mark the start – though not the end – of Rule 2111’s sanctions analysis. In general, for suitability violations, they recommend a fine between $5000 and $116,000 and a ban from the securities industry of between 10 days to 2 years.[73] Nonetheless, where “aggravating factors predominate,” the Guidelines “urge [panels] to consider strongly” a permanent bar from the securities industry.[74]
Often, these two guidelines fold into each other, and the penalty phase becomes a battle over the number and significance of aggravating factors.[75] When cases are adjudicated to final judgment, a complete bar is not unusual.[76]
The Guidelines provide a non-exhaustive list of 20 factors panels might consider. These factors are not necessarily aggravating or mitigating – a label that depends on the facts of each case. That said, often, most of the factors are aggravating.[77]
Venturino offers a good example. There, the panel determined Venturino’s misconduct covered nine factors on the list, all of which were aggravating. These included
- A history of misconduct, encompassing twelve customer complaints over nine years, with allegations of churning, unsuitable recommendations and unauthorized trading (Factor No. 1 in the Guidelines);
- Failure to take responsibility for his unsuitable recommendations (Factor No. 2);
- A pattern of misconduct in that his numerous unsuitable recommendations stretched over a lengthy period (No.’s 8, 9, and 17);
- Concealing his misconduct from customers (No. 10);
- Causing his customers significant monetary loss (No. 11);
- Reckless conduct (No. 13); and
- Profiting from his misconduct (No. 16).
The panel sanctioned Venturino with a permanent bar.[78]
When an advisor gets less than a permanent bar, two factors are often present. First, the unsuitable recommendations were limited to one or a small number of customers.[79] Second, the advisor did not make unsuitable recommendations for sinister reasons. While this factor may rescue the advisor’s career, it does not always paint a flattering picture. In Colletti, the panel found that Colletti’s recommendations arose from his “significant misunderstanding of securities rules and policies on authorization.”[80] Thus, in addition to an 8-month suspension and $10,000 fine, it required him to “requalify as a General Securities Representative” before reentering the securities industry.[81] That said, other advisors do not suffer quite the same embarrassment. Noard’s assessments were merely “faulty,” with the panel adding that he also tried to place the customer in lower risk debentures.[82]
III. CONCLUSION
For customers, the consequences of a bad investment can be disastrous. Given that, suitability asks advisors to be thorough and careful in making recommendations. Otherwise, he or she could be left taking the fall if the investment goes wrong.
That said, Rule 2111 violations are preventable. On the front end, advisors can do their due diligence and check with knowledgeable people who can verify whether the proposed investment is suitable.
___________________________________________________________
[1] This article uses “advisor” as an umbrella term encompassing any registered representative or principal who acts in a financial advising capacity and is subject to FINRA rules.
[2] FINRA Rule 2111, Suppl. Material .05; See also Dep’t of Enforcement v. Colletti, No. 2019061942901, 2024 FINRA Discip., at *14 (OHO Feb. 28, 2024)
[3] See e.g., Dep’t of Enforcement v. Newport Coast Securities, No. 2012030564701, 2018 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 14, at *53 (NAC May 23, 2018)
[4] Id.
[5] Dep’t of Enforcement v. Noard, No. 2012034936101, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 15, at *7 (NAC May 12, 2017); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Patatian, No. 2018057235801, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 13, at *16 (NAC Sept. 27, 2023)
[6] Newport Coast Securities, 2018 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 53
[7] Dep’t of Enforcement v. Reyes, No. 2016051493704, 2021 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 29, at *21 (NAC Oct. 7, 2021)
[8] Id.; See Newport Coast Securities, 2018 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 54-55 (Advisor knew almost nothing about exchange traded funds he recommended)
[9] Dep’t of Enforcement v. Siegel, No. C05020055, 2007 NASD Discip. LEXIS 20, at *17 (NAC May 11, 2007)
[10] Id. at 15
[11] Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 17 (Patatian testified that his only effort to learn more about the REIT’s was speaking with other advisors at his firm.)
[12] Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 17; See also Siegel, 2007 NASD Discip. LEXIS at 15
[13] See Id. at 14; See also Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 19; See also Noard, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 7
[14] Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 19; Reyes, 2021 FINRA Discip. at 18
[15] Dep’t of Enforcement v. Watkins, No. 2009018771602, 2013 FINRA Discip., at *7 (NAC Dec. 31, 2013)
[16] See e.g., Newport Coast Securities, 2018 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 48; Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 33
[17] See e.g., Dane Faber,Exchange Act Release No. 49216, 57 SEC 297, 305, 311 (February 10, 2004); Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 2; Dep’t of Enforcement v. King, No. 2015044444801, 2017 FINRA Discip., at *15-17 (NAC July 20, 2017)
[18] See e.g., Noard, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 2; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Orlando, No. 2014043863001, 2020 FINRA Discip., at *6 (NAC March 16, 2020)
[20] See e.g., Noard, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 5-6, 8-9
[21] See e.g., Id.; Newport Coast Securities, 2018 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 51-53
[22] See e.g., Newport Coast Securities, 2018 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 54-55; Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 17
[23] See e.g., Id.
[24] See e.g., Faber, 57 SEC at 303-304; Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 6
[25] See e.g., Noard, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 4; Faber, 57 SEC at 305; Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 7
[26] Noard, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 1-2
[27] Id. at 2
[29] Id. at 3-4
[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 4
[32] Id. at 5-6
[33] Id. at 8-9
[34] Id.
[35] Dane Faber,Exchange Act Release No. 49216, 57 SEC 297, 301-303 (February 10, 2004)
[36] Id. at 301
[37] Id.
[38] Id. at 303-307
[39] Id. at 302-304
[40] Id. at 303-304
[41] Id. at 303
[42] Id. at 303-304
[43] Id. at 305
[44] Id. at 311
[45] Id.
[46] Id. at 311-312
[47] Watkins, 2013 FINRA Discip. at 2
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Id.
[53] Id. at 2-3
[54] Id. at 3
[55] Id.
[56] Id.
[57] Id. at 5
[58] Id. at 5-6
[59] Faber, 57 SEC at 311
[60] Noard, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 8–9
[61] Faber,57 SEC at 311
[62] FINRA Rule 2111, Suppl. Material .05
[64] Id. Prior to 2020, Rule 2111’s quantitative suitability test also included a requirement that the advisor have actual or de facto control over the customer’s account. FINRA removed this in 2020. See Regulatory Notice 20-18 | FINRA.org.
[65] Colletti, 2024 FINRA Discip. at 15; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Kayan Securities et al, Complaint No. 2019064935602, AWC at *3 (April 26, 2024)
[66] Colletti, 2024 FINRA Discip. at 15
[67] Ralph Calabro, Exchange Act Release No. 75076, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2175, at *13, FN 43, 44 (May 29, 2015) (Collecting cases) (Pursuant to churning analysis under Exchange Act); Colletti, 2024 FINRA Discip. at 15
[68] Id. at 15; Kayan Securities, AWC at 3
[69] Kayan Securities, AWC at 3
[70] Colletti, 2024 FINRA Discip. at 15; Kayan Securities, AWC at 3
[71] Colletti, 2024 FINRA Discip.at 15-16 (In several instances, Colletti used the customer’s account to engage in a pattern of “holding stocks for a short period of time, selling them at a loss or small profit, and charging significant commissions.”)
[72] Id. at 15
[73] FINRA March 2024 Sanctions Guidelines at 69
[74] Colletti, 2024 FINRA Discip. at 16; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Orlando, Complaint No. 2014043863001, 2020 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 26, at *23 (FINRA NAC Mar. 16, 2020)
[75] See e.g., King, 2017 FINRA Discip. at 24-26; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Taddonio, Porges, and Beyn, No. 2015044823501, 2015044823501, 2019 FINRA Discip., at *31-32 (NAC January 29, 2019)
[76] See e.g., King, 2017 FINRA Discip. at 24-26; Taddonio, Porges, and Beyn, 2019 FINRA Discip. at 31-32; Patatian, 2023 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 36-37
[77] See e.g., Dep’t of Enforcement v. Venturino, No. 2021070337501, 2024 FINRA Discip., at *83-88 (NAC Dec. 31, 2013)
[78] Id.
[79] See e.g., Noard, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 12-13 (One customer); Siegel, 2007 NASD Discip. LEXIS at 17 (Customers limited to two couples)
[80] Colletti, 2024 FINRA Discip. at 19
[81] Id. at 19-20
[82] Noard, 2017 FINRA Discip. LEXIS at 5-6, 8-9
Terry Brennan Law 